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Abstract  
 
This paper provides a review and commentary on the current financial and 
economic crisis. It considers important analytical and policy issues from a 
global and North-South perspective. The analytical questions cover issues such 
as the better than expected performance of the world economy, the role of 
global financial imbalances, and whether or not economic theory has been 
helpful. It is argued that close international cooperation and policy coordination 
are essential to recovery and an improved distribution of the fruits of growth.  
Cooperation and financial regulation are particularly necessary in order to 
prevent international contagion and cascading sovereign debt defaults.  
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1. Introduction 
 
It is generally accepted that the acute phase of the current global financial and 
economic crisis started in September 2008, with the demise of Lehman 
Brothers, a leading US investment bank. Eighteen months later, this paper 
reflects on many of the following issues: 
 
 Why the world economy has performed so much better than most 
analysts had expected when the crisis began.  
 Which economic theories, if any, have been helpful in explaining 
the course of the crisis to date. 
 To what extent, if any, were regulatory deficits in the field of 
finance and global financial imbalances responsible for the crisis? 
 How should the world’s financial system be organized so as to 
secure maximum sustainable and equitable growth for the real 
world economy? 
 The question of government debt and of the danger of inflation.  
 Other salient policy issues that have come to the fore, including 
that of the drawing down of sovereign debt. 
 
In the context of the continuing global economic and financial crisis, the 
economic significance of the above issues is self-evident. However, not all the 
above questions can be treated satisfactorily in a single paper, hence only a 
relatively few issues will be examined in detail.  
 
2. Economic and Financial Crisis and the Global Economy 
 
The causes (both short- and longer-term) of the current global economic and 
financial crisis have been discussed in a number of contributions, including 
Aiginger (2009), Eichengreen and O’Rourke (October 2008), IMF (2008, 2009, 
2010), Krugman (2008, 2009, 2010), Ormerod (2010), Solow (2009), UNCTAD 
(2008, 2009, 2010), UNDESA (2010), the US Council of Economic Advisers 
(2010). 
 
It is generally agreed that difficulties associated with the housing segment of the 
US house property market were the immediate cause of the crisis (see, for 
example, IMF, 2008a). Complex financial instruments that incorporated sub-
prime house mortgages lost their value as the housing bubble burst following 
ten years of continuous price rises based on expectations of a continuation of 
such increases. This housing bubble occurred despite the fact that during the 
previous two decades the supply of housing had increased appreciably (Solow, 
2009). In brief, house prices had risen because interest rates were low and credit 
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was easily available, and prices were expected to continue to increase, much as 
in the case of the classic tulip mania and bubble in the early 17th century when, 
at its peak, the price of a tulip bulb Holland was equivalent to that of a three-
story town house.  
 
Housing bubbles have occurred many times before in American economic 
history without leading to an acute economic and financial crisis, let alone in the 
rest of the world. This episode was different in that it was accompanied by a 
bubble in US share and other asset prices. Moreover, the bursting of the US 
housing bubble led to a fall in share prices not only in the U.S. but also around 
the world. This was due to the much closer integration of world stock markets 
resulting from the financial globalization that had occurred in the previous two 
decades. It is interesting to note that bank losses due to the failure in the sub-
prime mortgages market are estimated to have been around US$250 billion. The 
consequent financial crisis led to a sharp fall in aggregate world stock market 
capitalization of the order of US$26 trillion in one year – nearly one hundred 
times larger than the losses associated with sub-prime mortgages.1  Robert 
Solow (2009) notes that the combined result of the housing and stock market 
shocks was a fall in US household wealth from US$64.4 trillion in mid-2007 
(before the crisis) to US$51.5 trillion at the end of 2008. Thus 13 trillion dollars 
of household wealth disappeared in the space of about one year. As Solow 
(2009) rightly observes:  
 
Nothing concrete had changed. Buildings still stood; factories were 
still capable of functioning; people had not lost their ability to work 
or their skills or their knowledge of technology. But a population 
that thought in 2007 that they had 64.4 trillion dollars with which 
to plan their lives discovered in 2008 that they have lost 20 per cent 
of that. 
 
Many economists date the acute phase of the present crisis to the bankruptcy of 
Lehman Brothers USA in September 2008. Whether or not the collapse of this 
important financial institution was the root cause of the crisis, it certainly 
provided the trigger. In a comparison of the crisis of the 1930s and that 
beginning in 2008, Christina Romer, currently Chair of the US Council of 
Economic Advisers, observes ‘In 2008, the U.S. financial system had similarly 
survived the initial declines in house and stock prices…but the outright failure 
of Lehman Brothers proved too much for the system. As has been described by 
many others, the breakdown in funding relationships in the week following 
Lehman’s collapse was almost unfathomable. The financial system truly froze’ 
(Romer, 2010: 3). 
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3. Short and Long Term Causes of the Crisis 
 
In addition to the literature on the failure of the sub-prime mortgage market, 
there is by now a relatively large literature on the other short-term as well as 
long-term ‘causes’ of the current economic and financial crisis. It is too near the 
events to expect a consensus to emerge on the causes of the crisis except 
perhaps on the observation that it had multiple causes. The diverse contributions 
on this topic have been succinctly and most helpfully summarized by Aiginger 
(2009, Table 1). For reasons of space only some of the causes listed in Table 1 
are discussed in the following sections.  
 
Table 1: A Summary Table of the Causes of the Economic and Financial Crisis 
 
  
Source: Aiginger (2009) 
Causes Economic and Financial Crisis 
Trigger Unsecured loans to US home owners 
Politically welcomed, cleverly sold 
Bundled, rated and passed on 
Regulation 
Failures 
Underestimation of risks and belief in self regulation 
Overwhelmed by innovations and internationalization 
Pro cyclical effects were supported by rules (mark to market valuation, Basel 2) 
Oligopoly structure of credit rating agencies, incompatibilities, stock market listing 
Neglect of cumulative systemic risks 
Insufficient regulation of the derivative market, SPVs, Hedge funds 
Inflated Expectations of 
Returns: 
Heterogeneity of profits across to countries/businesses, activities  
New form of equity substitutes 
Leveraging of banks, firms and consumers 
Imprudent in incentive 
systems/risk management: 
Bonus for short term success, stock options 
Over leveraging and hybrid capital 
Illusion about the benefits of mergers and firm size (market wide oligopolies) 
Speculation as an attractive career 
Higher earnings in financial capital relative to real capital 
Risk free promises from advisors, pension funds in mathematical models 
Macro-economic 
imbalances: 
Savings surplus of the emerging Asian countries, oil producers 
Triple deficit in the USA: trade budget and savings 
Insufficient reduction in money supply after the recovery in 2002 
Reinvestment of rent seeking capital in the USA 
Aggravating factors: Bubbles in currency, raw material, oil and foods stuffs 
Specialized plus just-in-time relationships with purchasers/subcontractors 
Short-term view regarding profits, accounting rules and analysts’ reports 
Shortage of raw materials, energy, food stuffs 
Unequal income and wealth distribution 
Provision of loans and then selling them on (‘originate to distribute’) 
Weakness in coordination IMF, Work bank, G7, competition policy, tax havens 
Underestimation of systemic risks 
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3.1 Deficits in Regulation 
 
It is widely agreed that a major long-term factor in the making of the crisis was 
the lack of government regulation, both national and international, of financial 
institutions in the US and worldwide.  In turn, this regulatory deficit appears to 
have arisen from an ideological faith in the virtues of the free market. It was 
believed not only that the market was always efficient but that it was also self-
correcting (see further Ormerod, 2010).  Alan Greenspan, the former Chairman 
of the Federal Reserve, in his 2009 testimony to a US Congressional 
Committee, stated that regulation was considered a negative factor for financial 
innovation, growth and prosperity (Greenspan, 2009a).  The net result of this 
mindset was the evolution of a largely unregulated parallel banking system 
performing the functions of banks but without being subject to banking 
regulations (Krugman, 2008).  
 
However, in his most recent testimony before the US Congress, Alan Greenspan 
(Greenspan 2009b) has spiritedly defended himself against the dual charge that 
he was responsible for the housing bubble due to his low interest rate policy and 
for not puncturing the bubble before it reached a level that would cause serious 
systemic difficulties.  Greenspan suggested that his critics had short memories 
as many of them had earlier applauded sub-prime mortgages as being of 
tremendous benefit to low-income Americans.  Furthermore, he suggested that 
at the time many people would have questioned whether there was indeed a 
housing bubble and asked how, in any case, the Federal Reserve would know 
the answer to this question better than the market.  
 
Robust responses to Greenspan’s arguments have been made by James 
Galbraith (2010), Paul Krugman (2010) and Robert Solow (2009), among 
others.  They suggest that the securitization of sub-prime mortgages through 
their marketing as a combined financial product was little understood by the 
market.  This, together with complex credit default swaps, as well as several 
other financial innovations, could be regarded as a fraudulent practice that 
should have been tightly regulated.  Krugman (2010) suggests that, had the 
wide-ranging reforms currently under discussion in the US Congress been in 
place earlier, ‘a handful of lavishly-paid leaders of the financial industry would 
not have been able to mislead and exploit consumers and investors.’ 
 
3.2 World Financial Imbalances 
 
Apart from the above question of regulatory deficits with respect to the 
functioning of financial markets, many economists believe that the huge global 
imbalances in the current accounts of nation states contributed to financial 
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fragility and crisis. The latter arises because if deficits cannot be financed, this 
could result in disorderly and unwanted currency devaluations. Fear of such 
events may lead to widespread turbulence in financial markets and national 
economies.   
 
In 2004, the US current account deficit amounted to $666 billion dollars, 
comprising 69 per cent of the total deficit of countries running negative current 
account balances that year (Table 2).  This compares with a current account 
deficit of US$ 413.5 in 2000, which accounted for 62.2 per cent of total deficits.  
In the last quarter of 2005 (using a figure not in Table 2) the US deficit was 
estimated to be around $700 billion dollars, 7 per cent of US GDP.  Thus before 
the crisis, an already high US deficit was getting bigger, which, on the face of it, 
was not a healthy development.  Nevertheless, an essential point is that the 
markets seemed to have accepted the situation as indicated by the relative 
stability of exchange rates of the main currencies (see Cooper (2005), Summers 
(2006)).2 
 
 
Table 2: Current Account Balances, selected economies, 2000-04 
 
Source: Reproduced from Singh, 2007 
Year 2000 2002 2004 2000 2002 2004 
Economies ($ Billion) (As a percentage of total 
surplus or deficit) 
Surplus 
economies 
Japan 119.6 112.6 171.8 23.8 21.1 19.3 
Germany -25.7 43.1 96.4 3.9 8.4 10.0 
China 20.5 35.4 70.0 4.1 6.9 7.9 
Russian 
Federation 
44.6 30.9 59.6 8.9 6.0 6.7 
Saudi Arabia 14.3 11.9 49.3 2.9 2.3 5.5 
Deficit 
Economies 
United States -413.5 -473.9 -665.9 62.2 72.5 69.0 
Spain -19.4 -15.9 -49.2 2.9 2.4 5.1 
United Kingdom -36.5 -26.4 -47.0 5.5 4.0 4.9 
Australia -15.3 -16.6 -39.4 2.3 2.5 4.1 
Italy -5.8 -6.7 -24.8 0.9 1.0 2.6 
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An RIS (Research and Information System for Developing Countries) 2008 
policy brief provides a stark outline of the evolution of the US international and 
national financial situation, as follows. In the period 1970-91, the cumulative 
current account deficit of the US was US$ 881.5 billion, increasing to US$ 
1,569.3 billion during 1992-2000 and in the period 2001-2006 it reached US$ 
3,572.5 billion, with a deficit of US$ 811.5 billion in 2006 alone. In recent 
years, China’s foreign exchange surpluses have financed the growing US 
current account deficits at low interest rates.3  
 
It is important to note, however, that China is not the main, let alone the only, 
economy to run a large current account surplus. In 2004, before the global 
financial and economic crisis, China’s current account surplus of US$ 70 billion 
accounted for less than 8 per cent of the total surpluses of countries with a 
positive current account balance (Table 2).  Table 2 also suggests that in 2004 
China’s surplus was considerably smaller than that of either Germany or Japan, 
particularly the latter.   
 
Other RIS data also indicate that the US has been living ‘beyond its means’ both 
at the household and government levels, stretching their respective budget 
constraints. Household savings that had been about 10 per cent of GDP in 1980 
and 7 per cent in 1990 were only 0.4 per cent in 2007.  The Federal budget, 
which had a surplus of US$ 236.2 billion in 2000, recorded a deficit of US$ 400 
billion in the 2008 financial year. Mortgage debt ballooned from US$3.8 trillion 
in 1980 to US$14.4 trillion in the third quarter of 2007 and consumer credit 
increased from US$0.35 trillion in 1980 to US$2.5 trillion in 2007.  By 
financing the recurring current account deficits through borrowing from abroad, 
the US became a net debtor to the outside world, with the net investment 
position showing a negative balance of US$2.5 trillion in 2006. 
 
The US has been both living beyond its means and yet growing faster than other 
advanced industrial countries such as Germany and Japan who are living within 
their means. Paradoxically, therefore, the international financial system appears 
to favour profligacy rather than thrift. Further, capital has been flowing from 
developing to developed countries (from China to the US, for example) that is, 
in a direction contrary to that which might be deemed appropriate from a 
development perspective. 
 
Even those who do not regard global imbalances (particularly those of China 
and the US) to be the root cause of the crisis acknowledge that re-balancing is 
required, principally involving the elimination of high long-term deficits (as in 
the US) and persistent high surpluses (as in China). In policy terms this means 
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having a zero current account deficit at the desired rate of growth of GDP that 
would achieve full employment. 
 
In the case of the US, over the four-year period 2007-2010, the current account 
deficit declined from 5.2 per cent of GDP in 2007 to 2.2 per cent in 2010 (IMF, 
2009a and 2009b). This reduction was the result of the compression of 
economic activity during the recession and the deficit may well grow again as 
economic growth resumes. 
 
China’s surplus, on the other hand, has remained more or less constant over the 
four-year period 2007-2010, amounting to 11 per cent of GDP in 2007 and an 
average of 8 per cent over the next three years (UNDESA, 2010). Its optimal 
surplus would be that which corresponded to the full employment level of the 
economy and desired growth of real wages. In both the case of the US and 
China, this rebalancing may require considerable change in economic structure: 
in the former a greater emphasis on exports and a lower level of consumption 
and imports; in the latter a lower level of exports and greater reliance on 
domestic consumption and increased imports.  
  
Such rebalancing is likely to affect all countries, whether or not they have 
contributed significantly to the global imbalances. In order to rebalance the 
world economy fully and reduce persistent surpluses and chronic deficits, it is 
necessary to consider also the cases of Japan and Germany (Akyuz, 2010). 
These two countries have also been running large trade surpluses with the US, 
although they have been considerably smaller than those of China. China’s 
overall exports surplus with all countries is not very large, but it is 
disproportionately large with the US.   
 
Apart from the trade and current account imbalances, there is another major 
imbalance in the global economy that requires urgent resolution. This concerns 
the distribution of both personal and functional income and their implications 
for aggregate consumption and aggregate demand. Under globalization, the 
power of workers in most advanced countries has been sharply reduced while 
that of capital has increased due largely to the free movement of capital. As a 
consequence, real wage growth has been lower than productivity growth. This 
process threatens to result in global under-consumption which, other things 
being equal, will reduce both growth and employment.    
 
To conclude, there is a need to redress imbalances between consumption and 
investment in major economies. However, it must be noted that, despite a 
longstanding and growing US current account deficit, there was no crisis in the 
sense of a disorderly devaluation of the dollar. This leads some to reject the 
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notion of financial imbalances as being a major cause of the crisis, pointing to 
the fact that there was no run on the dollar. Opponents of this view suggest that 
the crisis that emerged in 2008 was due to uncontrolled US deficits. They 
further allege that the US took advantage of the dollar being the world’s only 
reserve currency such that its current account deficits went unchecked.  
 
4. Why Has The World Economy Performed Better Than Expected? 
 
Christina Romer (Romer 2009) argues that the shocks that hit the US economy 
in the autumn of 2008 were at least as large as those experienced in 1929. A 
salient shock in both crises was the fall in household wealth: this fell by 17 per 
cent between December 2007 and December 2008 in the US. This was more 
than five times the decrease in 1929. 
 
An important negative feature of the current crisis compared with that of the 
1930s is the role and nature of banks and the collapse of inter-bank relations and 
that of trade credit for big and small businesses. Banks have refused to lend to 
other banks or to non-bank financial institutions. Similarly asset price volatility 
in the US has been greater in the current crisis than in the past. A great deal of 
research indicates that such volatility has an adverse effect on the level of 
investment. Notwithstanding these negative factors, the actual outcomes during 
the current crisis have fortunately so far been more benign. 
 
During the Great Depression of the 1930’s, the largest fall in the US GDP in a 
twelve-month period was of the order of 30 per cent. Employment in that 12-
month period went down by 25 per cent. The depressed state of the economy 
continued until the beginning of the Second World War (Romer, 2009). 
 
In the current downturn, falls in GDP in US, Europe and the world economy 
have been of a much lower order than during the depression years. Although the 
numbers of unemployed, underemployed and discouraged workers have 
increased during the current crisis, the rise has been far less than during the 
1930s depression.4  
 
In 2009, for the first time in 50 years, world GDP shrank, but only by two per 
cent, and was expected to return to positive growth in 2010 (UNDESA, 2009). 
Whether or not this growth is sustained and leads to resumption of the previous 
growth path is as yet an open question.  It will depend on a number of factors 
including the debt and solvency crises in Greece, Spain, and Ireland. Although 
the decline in GDP for individual advanced countries has been greater than that 
for the world as a whole, none of these have reached the proportions of the 
1930s depression. The maximum reduction in GDP growth in 2009 in advanced 
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countries has ranged between two per cent and six per cent.  Furthermore, IMF 
data and projections indicate that most countries will have positive growth by 
the year 2010.  
 
What explains the seeming ability of the world economy to avert a depression 
as serious as that in the 1930s?  Evidence and analysis suggest three main 
reasons. The first is the outstanding record of India, China and other emerging 
countries both before and during the crisis. As Wolf (2008) suggests: ‘emerging 
economies had been an engine of growth for the past five years. China 
accounted for a quarter, Brazil Russia and India for another quarter, and all 
emerging and developing countries together for about two thirds’ (these 
calculations measure growth in PPP exchange rates). Despite the crisis these 
countries, particularly India and China, have been able to continue on their fast 
long-term growth path.  They may therefore be expected to remain as long-term 
positive factors in the evolution of the world economy: fast growth in these 
countries helps the US and other economies by maintaining high levels of world 
demand.  
 
The second major factor explaining the relatively good performance of the 
world economy during the present downturn has been the unexpected and 
welcome degree of cooperation between countries, symbolized by their  
adoption of coordinated global measures through the creation of the G20. This 
grouping includes all leading advanced countries and a number of emerging 
nations that together constitute about 85 per cent of world production and about 
two thirds of the world population. In 2009 the G20 agreed to a huge 
international stimulus even when many of them already had fiscal deficits. It 
was also agreed to cut interest rates and to strengthen the IMF and World Bank 
in order to help developing countries. This high degree of cooperation stands in 
striking contrast to the lack of cooperation and beggar-thy-neighbor policies that 
characterized nation states’ behaviour in the 1930s.5   
 
As mentioned above, a striking feature of the response to the current crisis has 
been an aggregate coordinated fiscal stimulus amounting in 2008-2009 to an 
enormous 2.6 billion US dollars, equivalent to 3.4 per cent of world GDP6 (see 
Table 3). As a proportion of their GDP, developing countries in general have 
had a greater stimulus than developed countries.  
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Table 3: Fiscal stimulus to address the global financial and economic crisis 
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There is evidence that the stimulus has been successful in the sense that, in 
general, the greater the stimulus received, the greater was a given country’s 
economic growth (US Council of Economic Advisers, 2010). Nevertheless, 
alongside this positive effect of the stimulus, the stimulus created fiscal 
difficulties for governments, leading to calls for the stimulus to be withdrawn or 
diminished in size. This would, however, be a serious mistake as a premature 
withdrawal of the stimulus when the world economy has not yet achieved 
reasonable economic growth (let alone reverted to its long-term growth rate) 
may push economies further into recession or even into full-scale depression if 
there are negative effects on expectations. It is therefore all the more important 
that the cooperation achieved so far in the G20 arrangement should continue so 
that there is a coordinated and well organized withdrawal of the fiscal stimulus 
at the appropriate time. The US experience between 1937 and 1940 (Romer, 
2009) and that of Japan more recently should be a warning to present-day 
policymakers in this respect.  
 
The third positive factor that has also helped improve the performance of world 
economy in relation to the present crisis can be described as an issue of 
governance. It so happened that economic leadership in the US in this period of 
crisis was held by an intellectually and politically close group of economists.  
These were conventional US Keynesian economists who defined the essential 
problem facing the world economy as being that of a shortage of aggregate 
demand.  Unlike the Chicago economists, they also believed that government 
induced stimuli could correct the demand deficits and thereby help the real 
economy.  The cohesive economic outlook of this team of economic advisors 
helped ensure clarity and purpose in the stimulus programme and its 
implementation.   
 
Not only were these economists well versed in economic theory, but also, if not 
more importantly, some of them, including Ben Bernanke (Chairman of the 
Federal Reserve) and Christina Romer (Chair, US Council of Economic 
Advisers), were serious students of the history of the Great Depression and were 
determined not to repeat the serious policy mistakes made during that period.   
 
To sum up, three factors -- namely continuing fast growth in India, China and 
other developing countries, unprecedented cooperation between countries 
symbolized by the G20, and the creation and governance by like-minded people 
of a corrective economic policy programme -- have been positive differences in 
the recent evolution of the world economy. Hopefully, these factors will 
continue to operate in this direction, even if certain other developments present 
obstacles to widespread resumption of reasonable growth rates.  
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5. Financial Globalization and the Real Economy 
 
The financial system and the conduct of monetary policy prior to the eruption of 
the financial crisis and onset of economic recession in 2008 have received 
thoroughly deserved criticism for allowing the development of the subprime 
mortgage bubble, the stock-market bubble and asset prices bubbles and not 
puncturing these in time or minimizing the damage. There were, however, some 
evident benefits, albeit unintended, of this regime for the real economy and 
which have not been adequately recognized (see below). Without a more 
balanced picture of the merits and demerits of the pre-crisis financial system 
and policies, future policy decisions may not be the most appropriate.  
 
Table 4 provides broad-brush data for selected countries and for the real 
economy during the last two decades. What is clear is that the world economy 
performed exceptionally well in real terms during the present decade, achieving 
arguably the highest growth rate ever. Further, between 2000-2007, developing 
countries grew at almost twice the rate of developed countries. This helped to 
marginally reduce the disparity between the rich and poor countries. Among 
developing countries India and China – the two most populous countries where 
the bulk of the population hitherto lived in absolute poverty – had stellar 
performances, experiencing historically unprecedented growth that has resulted 
in substantial poverty reduction.7 
 
Among the developed countries, the United States has been the leader in terms 
of real economic growth. Evidence suggests that in the period 1995-2005 it 
achieved a one percentage point increase in its long-term trend rate of growth of 
productivity (Jorgenson and Vu, 2005). Illustrative supporting data on this point 
are provided in Table 5. This is an impressive achievement bearing in mind that 
this is not a ‘catch-up economy’ but one operating at the frontiers of knowledge. 
Such a productivity increase implies a high degree of technical progress as well 
as concomitant organizational changes. This achievement would be considered 
even greater if the benefits of national productivity growth had been spread 
more widely. 
 
Evidence suggests that the US, India, China and a clutch of other countries -- 
the pre-crisis top performers in terms of growth rates -- were overall 
beneficiaries of international economic integration and financial globalization. 
In the case of India and China, this was partly due to the fact that they managed 
their integration into the global economy, in particular to avoid the harmful 
effects of unfettered capital flows. They also pursued a policy of ‘strategic 
integration’ in relation to trade and long-term investment (Singh, forthcoming).   
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Financial globalization enabled China to purchase US treasury bills, thereby 
helping the US to finance its current account deficit and keep US interest rates 
low. In addition, globalization has helped the US to keep domestic inflation in 
check, not least through imports of cheap consumer and intermediate products 
from China. (For a fuller discussion of the economic interactions between the 
US and the Chinese economy, see Singh, 2008.) 
 
Most students of the financial system would agree that its central purpose is to 
allocate society’s savings and investment resources to those households, 
corporations and jurisdictions that can use them most effectively. It could be 
argued that the pre-crisis financial system and monetary policies were 
performing that function, as is evidenced by very fast growth across the world 
economy during the period 2000-2007. However, the implosion resulting from 
dubious policies and unregulated practices highlight inherent flaws in this 
system. These rendered it unsustainable. The best that can be said about the pre-
crisis financial regime is that it demonstrated that the world economy had a 
growth potential of at least 5 per cent a year on the supply side.  
 
The purpose of any reform of the financial system should be to allow the world 
economy to grow at its full potential in a sustainable manner. It would be a 
travesty of justice from the perspective of the world’s poor if any reformed 
financial system fell short of the maximum sustainable growth objective.  
 
To sum up, it could be argued that the developing world under the recent global 
regime has taken a giant step forward; a reformed financial system must build 
on and promote this progress.  
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Table 4: Growth of World Output and that of Selected Countries and 
Regions1991-2007    (% per annum) 
 
Source: UNCTAD secretariat calculations, based on UNCTAD HANDBOOK 
of STATISTICS; and United Nations, Department of Economic and Social 
Affairs (UNDESA), LINK Global Economic Outlook 2008 (May 2008).  
 
 
Table 5: Explaining the Productivity Surge in the US 
 
 
Source: Jorgenson, Ho and Stiroh, 2007. 
 
 
 
 
 
Countries 1991-2001 
2001-
2007 
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
World 3.1 3.3 1.9 2.7 4.0 3.4 3.9 3.8 
Japan 1.1 1.8 0.3 1.4 2.7 1.9 2.4 2.1 
US 3.5 2.7 1.6 2.5 3.6 3.1 2.9 2.2 
European Union  2.4 2.1 1.2 1.3 2.5 1.8 3.0 2.9 
Germany 1.8 1.2 0.0 -0.2 1.2 0.9 2.9 2.5 
United Kingdom 2.8 2.6 2.1 2.7 3.3 1.9 2.8 3.0 
Russian 
Federation 
-- 6.7 4.7 7.3 7.1 6.4 6.7 8.1 
Africa 2.9 5.2 3.7 4.9 5.4 5.7 5.6 5.8 
Latin American 
and the Caribbean 
3.1 4.0 -0.5 2.2 6.2 4.9 5.6 5.7 
East Asia 7.8 8.1 7.4 7.1 8.3 8.0 8.8 9.1 
China 10.3 10.4 9.1 10.0 10.1 10.4 11.1 11.4 
India 5.9 8.0 3.6 8.3 8.5 8.8 9.2 9.7 
Average Annual Growth 1973-95 1995-03 Difference 
Labour Productivity 1.49 3.06 1.57 
O/w Capital Deepening 0.89 1.75 0.86 
Labour Quality 0.26 0.17 -0.09 
Total Factor Productivity 0.34 1.14 0.80 
15 
 
6. Economic Theory and the Current Crisis 
 
Economists’ analyses relating to one particular crisis are not necessarily 
relevant to another. The analytical lessons derived from the Latin American 
debt crisis of the 1980s do not explain the following crisis that erupted in Asia 
in the 1990s.  Similarly, the lessons of the Asian crisis of the 1990s do not seem 
to be applicable to the current financial crisis. 
 
The 1980s debt crisis had a devastating impact on Latin America.  It is widely 
agreed that for the continent as a whole it was a ‘lost decade’ characterized by 
little or no growth and a fall in per capita income of more than 15 per cent over 
the decade.  In contrast, per capita income in East Asian countries grew by more 
than 50 per cent during this period.  There is sharp contention between orthodox 
and heterodox economists regarding the reasons for the enormous differences in 
the performance of these two regions. Orthodox economists argue that the Latin 
America debt crisis was caused by domestic factors, namely micro-economic 
inefficiencies, macro-economic policy errors, and unwise borrowing and 
spending.  In contrast heterodox economists believe that the Latin American 
debt crisis was due to external factors over which these countries had no 
control. In particular, they emphasize the changes in US monetary policy in the 
late 1970s that resulted in an increase in the real world interest rate from 0.5 per 
cent in the mid 1970s to 7 per cent in the early 1980s, a fourteen-fold increase 
(the so called ‘Volcker shock’). The impact on the highly-indebted Latin 
American economies was devastating.  
 
Heterodox economists argue that the restrictive changes in US monetary policy 
had a greater impact on Latin America than Asia. This was partly due to Latin 
America’s higher initial level of debt and its structure. In addition, Latin 
America was more affected by adverse changes in the terms-of-trade than was 
Asia.8 Further, as Fishlow (1991) points out, Latin America countries, unlike 
Asian countries, were subject to capital supply shocks due to contagion. Taken 
together, as they should be, these shocks were far greater for Latin America 
than for Asia. Hence Latin America countries became more heavily balance-of-
payments constrained and for a much longer period than did the Asian 
countries. This explains their relatively poor economic performance in the ‘lost 
decade’ (Singh, 1993). Thus it is argued that the budget and current account 
deficits in Latin America were both the cause and consequence of their debt 
crisis.  
 
The 1997-2000 Asian crisis was of a rather different kind than that in Latin 
America. By and large, governments in Asia have had a record of managing 
their macro-economic policies well. It was the private sector’s excessive 
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borrowing in foreign currency and the consequent mismatch between expected 
inflows and outflows that led to the Asian crisis. It could be said to have been a 
case of government virtue and private sector profligacy. However, leading US 
officials, including Alan Greenspan, Larry Summers, and the IMF itself, later 
put forward a more ideological explanation for the Asian crisis. They argued 
that, although some micro- or macro -economic disequilibria (such as the 
Bangkok property boom) may have been the trigger for the crisis, the root cause 
was nothing less than the entire ‘Asian way of doing business’. This was 
characterized by close relationships between government, business and finance 
in the day-to-day micro-economic behaviour of economic agents, namely by 
‘crony capitalism’. This is alleged to have resulted in serious distortions in the 
economy and in economic management, leading ultimately to the crisis. (See 
Glen and Singh (2005) for a fuller discussion of these issues.) 
 
This version of events is highly disputed by heterodox economists. They argue 
that the root cause of the crisis was the introduction of financial liberalization 
before prudential regulation had been instituted.  They point out that other 
countries, including China and India, which did not fully liberalize their 
financial sector, escaped the crisis, whereas countries that did (Indonesia, 
Korea, Thailand) were badly affected. In sum, it is suggested here that the Asian 
crisis was due to financial liberalization in the absence of prudential regulation 
rather than to ‘too much government’. 
 
The essential point, however, is to emphasize that each economic and financial 
crisis is of a rather different nature. One hallmark of the present crisis has been 
the credit crunch, whereby banks stopped lending to other banks and businesses, 
thereby disrupting the system of credit that oils the workings of a modern 
economy. In response, governments resorted to bailing out banks and other 
financial institutions that were deemed too big to be allowed to fail, in the sense 
that their failure would have enormous external diseconomies for other firms 
and institutions. 
  
Thus, analyses of major financial crises during the past four decades are not 
directly applicable to the current crisis. Each crisis has been different from the 
one before. Every major crisis therefore needs to be examined in its own right 
with a fresh eye, before any firm analytical and policy conclusions can be drawn 
from that experience.  
 
In addition to analyzing crisis episodes it is also essential to examine the role of 
macroeconomic theory as currently taught in universities and used by policy-
makers in central banks in explaining and tackling the present crisis. Neither 
university macro-economists nor the best central bank practitioners foresaw the 
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eruption of the 2008 financial crisis. Rival schools of thought in the currently 
dominant macroeconomic theory (US Keynesian and the Chicago classical 
school) have recently found common ground on key aspects of macro-economic 
theory. Both sides have accepted the ‘rational expectations’ basis of the micro-
economic theory underlying the macro construction. In sum, it is assumed that 
households maximize utility, firms maximize profits and economic agents make 
decisions on the basis of rational expectations. These ideas lead to sophisticated 
dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models (DSGE), which are so complex 
that they cannot be solved analytically, but require numerical methods and 
considerable computer power for their solution. Nevertheless, such models were 
singularly unhelpful in predicting the current crisis. It is convincingly argued by 
Ormerod (2010) that these models are based on risk calculations but did not 
take into account uncertainty. (Risk is predictable in the sense that the 
probability distribution of future outcomes can be estimated. This is not so at all 
for uncertainty.) Ormerod (2010) observes: ‘in the brave new world of DSGE, 
the possibility of a systemic collapse, of a cascade of defaults across the system, 
was never considered.’ 
 
Nevertheless, in the event, when it came to devising the policy response, key 
policy-makers gained greater wisdom from basic Keynesian economic theory 
and from economic history than from modern macroeconomics. US economic 
advisors and policy-makers drew on the former and defined the essential 
problem of the crisis in terms of a shortage of world aggregate demand, and 
they referred to the economic history of the Great Depression to avoid the 
policy mistakes of that period. This explains the priority given to saving the 
financial system through unprecedented bail-outs. It is commonly believed that 
the failure of several thousand banks in the US in the 1930s contributed to the 
prolongation of the Great Depression. Similarly, the success of the giant 
economic stimulus programmes associated with the New Deal suggested that 
similar measures should be used once again to a avert a worsening recession.   
 
Lessons also need to be drawn from more recent history, namely that of Japan, 
whose average annual growth rate for the first decade of the 2000s fell to a mere 
1 per cent. The reasons for this economy’s prolonged and abysmal performance 
need to be studied and understood. Japan has evidently been faced with 
enormous under-consumption problems in response to which neither the 
government’s monetary or fiscal policies have met with success.  Greater 
research efforts devoted to Japan’s economic dilemma are likely to be as, if not 
more, rewarding for the economies of developed countries than further 
development of DSGE models.  
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7. Conclusion:  The Way Forward 
 
The ongoing policy collaboration between countries - symbolized by the G20 - 
provides one of the chief grounds for optimism in relation to the present crisis 
and for the future. Nevertheless as noted before, there are well-founded 
criticisms regarding the legitimacy of the exclusive G20 group itself. Moreover, 
many G20 members are disappointed with the process due to the fact that G7 
members (the rich countries) are yet to make meaningful concessions regarding 
reform of the IMF articles of agreement, including the weighting of voting 
power (Chin (2010) and Helleiner and Kirshner (2009)). Nevertheless, the G20 
process remains a promising start to more meaningful international economic 
cooperation.  
 
It has been argued that agreement among the G20 has been entirely due to the 
adverse circumstances in which most countries found themselves and that, once 
the world economy recovers, collective action will cease. However, on a priori 
grounds, an equally if not more plausible scenario is that the apparent success of 
collective action will encourage nation states to take further coordinated action 
to resolve their difficulties. Indeed, it can be argued that the international 
consensual approach outlined above is imperative if the imbalances in the 
global economy that many economists believe were a principal long-term cause 
of the crisis are to be resolved. 
 
A stronger reason for optimism is the continuing fast growth (albeit a little 
lower than pre-crisis) in India, China and other developing countries and their 
contribution to the growth of world demand and reduction of world poverty.  
 
Although the world economy’s growth path for the period 2000-2007 was 
ultimately unsustainable, due in part to the rising US current account deficit and 
in part to the weaknesses of the financial system, this growth certainly took the 
global economy a long way forward in various respects, as outlined earlier. The 
important issue now is which factors will determine the outcome for the real 
world economy in the next decade or two after the crisis? Will there be a new 
growth path and will it be more or less satisfactory than the previous one, both 
from an economic and social point of view? What is required is a growth path 
that allows the world economy to operate at its full sustainable potential, while 
reducing the risks of renewed global financial fragility and crisis. The central 
message of this contribution is that, for this to be possible, increasing global co-
operation is necessary in trade and investment and in the related fields of food, 
environment and energy. Equally importantly, a more equal distribution of 
income, wealth and social protection, as well as returns to capital and labour, 
are desirable, not only for their own sake but also to resolve the incipient world 
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under-consumption problem before this becomes a serious obstacle to fast 
economic growth.  
 
It is, however, legitimate to ask whether the above is likely to happen. The 
analysis in this paper and currently available information point to three broad 
possible outcomes. The first and most optimistic is one in which the worst is 
over and the global financial system has been thoroughly reformed in a manner 
that ensures its stability and enhances its contribution to more equitable global 
development. At the time of writing, the latest information about the economy 
suggests that the most affected countries are recovering quite satisfactorily. The 
chief economist of the IMF recently reported (Blanchard, 2010) that the global 
economy has been recovering better than expected and global growth is 
expected to reach a rate of 4.2 per cent in 2010 (an upwards revision compared 
with the IMF forecasts at the beginning of that year (IMF, 2010a, 2010b) and to 
reach 4.3 per cent in 2011. Global trade and capital flows have been recovering 
very fast. Even unemployment, which is normally a lagging indicator, has at 
long last begun to decline, at least in the US (Chandra, 2010). These recent 
short-term improvements can be interpreted as suggesting that the evolution of 
the world economy is pointing in a positive direction. However, Blanchard 
(2010: 2) warns that these ‘good numbers hide a more complex reality, namely 
a tepid recovery in many advanced economies, and a much stronger one in most 
emerging and developing economies.’  This statement suggests an uncertain 
outcome for the world economy.  
 
One of the biggest global worries concerns the current European sovereign debt 
situation that has major implications for the world economy. One cannot 
dismiss the possibility of a cascading financial crisis due initially to contagion 
in the Euro area (starting with a default in Greece and potentially in Portugal, 
Spain and Italy, and even elsewhere in Europe) and resulting in a speculative 
attack on the Euro currency. The likelihood of such a turn of events may have a 
small probability, but in view of our limited capacity to predict the future it 
would be unwise to rule out a major crisis, particularly bearing in mind very 
recent experience. To avert such an economic, social and political catastrophe, 
coordinated consultation and action by nations and European and global 
institutions are required to tame the financial markets. 
 
In any conflict of interest between states and the financial markets, clearly the 
interests of the former should and can prevail. In view of the dimensions of the 
European sovereign debt problem, and to avert a run on the currency, a rescue 
package of three quarters of a trillion euros has already been put in place. If in 
the worst-case scenario this should prove inadequate, and European nations 
consider the European Union and the common currency to be vital for European 
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peace and development, they could in principle act in concert and challenge the 
markets by introducing an even bigger financial package, thereby stopping 
speculators in their tracks.9 In this context it should be noted that the €750 
billion bail out is worth 6 per cent of the GDP of the European Union. Putting 
this in a historical context, it may be recalled that just over 60 years ago the US 
administration, faced with what they perceived as a communist threat to 
Western Europe, intervened with the Marshall Plan. The value of this plan over 
a three-year period amounted to 4 per cent of US GDP (Glyn et al. 1991).10 EU 
countries have clearly demonstrated their resolve to overcome the markets in 
order to save the Union.  
 
To sum up, the challenge presented by the current crisis to policymakers around 
the world is first and foremost to avoid long-term stagnation resulting from 
injudicious policies. This would suggest, inter alia, resisting a premature 
drawing down of government debt in rich countries. The associated reduction in 
state expenditure and increases in taxation are likely to prolong the recession 
and unemployment, with consequent ripple effects that could result in continued 
long-term stagnation throughout the global economy. In addition to avoiding 
stagnation, concerted action is required to introduce national and international 
supervision and regulation of financial markets. Further measures are also 
needed to achieve a rebalancing of the global economy such that it reaches its 
full supply side potential, while also achieving an improvement in inter-country 
distribution of growth and development. In short, markets should serve the 
people rather than determining their socio-economic destiny.11 
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Notes 
 
1 These numbers illustrate the orders of magnitude involved in the stock market 
contagion at that time. In fact in the first six months share prices fell and then 
rose over the next six months.   
 
2 Another related manifestation of global imbalances before the crisis was the 
huge and growing foreign currency reserves of the Chinese Central Bank.  In 
the second quarter of 2010 the total value of these reserves was estimated to be 
around 2.4 trillion US dollars (Chin, 2010).  
 
3 There is a ‘blame-game’ with respect to who bears responsibility for the 
current large imbalances -- the profligate US consumer causing the country’s 
current account deficit, or the Asian peoples’ high propensity to save, resulting 
in current account surpluses.  Such a construction of events can be interpreted 
negatively as suggesting that the US attracts savings from the world’s poorer 
nations thereby depriving the latter of much-needed capital.  However, Larry 
Summers (2005) suggested that such arguments are based on presumptions that 
do not tally with the broader facts.  Specifically, he observed that during the last 
decade the world has been awash with savings and liquidity.  Had the US been 
extracting savings from the rest of the world at the expense of investment 
elsewhere, the likely result would have been rising global real interest rates 
rather than the low rates actually experienced. 
 
4  The only OECD country to reach the unemployment level experienced by the 
US in the 1930s is Spain, with a current unemployment rate of 19 per cent 
(Economist, Economic and Financial Indicators, May 1, 2010).   
 
5  However, it can be argued that the G20 is far from an ideal vehicle for 
international cooperation as it excludes more than 150 countries.  Nevertheless, 
some argue that a group bigger than the G20 may not be a practical device for 
agreeing and implementing decisive measures to cope with the crisis.  
 
6  The source of these figures is UNDESA (2010 table 4 page 12) 
 
7  There is scholarly dispute over the Indian figures for poverty reduction. 
However, the Indian government’s view and that of many scholars is that gains 
in poverty reduction from fast growth have been significant. See further 
Planning Commission of India (2009).  
 
8  For a detailed analysis of the debt crisis of the 1980s see Singh 1993; Ross   
1991; Fishlow 1990; Hughes and Singh 1991. 
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9 The effectiveness of this measure was demonstrated by the Hong-Kong 
Central Bank’s punitive action against speculators during the 1997-1999 Asian 
crisis.  
  
10 An even more pessimistic scenario would, as noted above, involve contagion 
beyond Europe and wider sovereign debt default. In the absence of coordinated 
policies and action, such a development would result in widespread financial 
chaos, economic disruption, unemployment and lower standards of living for 
many people worldwide.  
 
11 It will be argued by some that reduced long-term economic growth may be 
positive by effecting a reduction in global warming and conserving natural 
resources. However, important issues such as climate change and redistribution 
of income are beyond the scope of this short paper. 
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